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Abstract
A stochastic joint lot size model has been developed in which demand of
the customer and the stock level of the vendor are assumed to be identically
distributed continuous random variables. The effective ways for a compromise
between the vendor and the customer at a common lot size with certain amount
of price adjustments are determined and the methodology is explained through
a numerical example.
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1 Introduction
The well known EOQ model used so far, for the determination of order quantity in an
inventory management system is considered from either the customer’s point of view
or from the vendor’s point of view. Such models are applicable when both the parties
operate independently. This strategy places one of the parties in a disadvantageous
position. Such type of problems are usually solved in a Just -in-Time(JIT) system
of production where the order quantity and production batch quantity are identical.
However JIT concept can only be successful if both the customer and the vendor
have high flexible management systems. In most of the cases, such ideal conditions
do not exist. Hence an alternative solution to the above problem can be obtained
through a mutual negotiation between the customer and the vendor on order quantity,
lead time etc., in which both the parties jointly agree to a management schedule in
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stead of the weaker of the two adjusting his cost policy according to the convenience
of the stronger one. Some authors like Goyal [2], Banerjee [1] have discussed about
such negotiations through a new version of the EOQ model with joint replenishment.
Banerjee [1] developed a deterministic JELS model in which the respective lot sizes of
the customer and the vendor were assumed to be uniform over time and shortages were
not allowed, while in real life situations, the demands are usually random variables and
shortages are very common. In this paper, an attempt has been made to formulate a
stochastic JELS model in which the demand of the customer and the stock level of the
vendor are identically distributed independent random variables defined over [0,∞).
To be more realistic, a situation where shortages are allowed has been considered. At
the end, a suggestion for optimization of individual lot size by introducing unit price
adjustment through a discount factor has been given. The model is verified through a
numerical example where the random variables are normally distributed in truncated
sense. Many researchers like Joglekar[3], Lee [4], Monahan [5] have discovered various
methods of discount polices to satisfy the vendor. This paper deals with a discount
policy which causes no loss to both the parties and both are getting some benefit.
2 Notations
Throughout this paper, the following notations and assumptions have been used.
z = Variable lot size (Z = z)for the fixed time interval t.
X = Random variable representing the demand of the customer with density fp(x) and∫∞
0 fp(x)dx = 1.
Y =Random variable representing the stock level of the vendor with density fv(y) and∫∞
0 fv(y)dy = 1.
Cp1 = Holding cost of the customer per unit item per t time units.
Cp2 = Shortage cost of the customer per unit item per t time units.
Cv1 = Holding cost of the vendor per unit item per t time unit.
Cv2 = Shortage cost of the vendor per unit item per t time unit.
z∗p = Optimum ELS of customer.
z∗v =Optimum ELS of vendor.
z∗ = Joint optimum lot size (JELS).
Cp(z) = Total expected relevant cost of the customer for demand z.
Cv(z)= Total expected relevant cost of the vendor for stock level z.
C(z) = Joint expected total relevant cost for a common lot size z of both the parties .
There is no set up cost and lead time is zero.
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3 Effect of Individual Optimization
The total relevant cost of the customer is
Cp(z) = Cp1
∫ z
0
(z − x)fp(x)dx+ Cp2
∫ ∞
z
(x− z)fp(x)dx
Cp(z) is a convex function of z and its global minimum occurs at z
∗
p where
φp(z
∗
p) =
∫ z∗p
0
fp(x)dx =
Cp2
Cp1 + Cp2
The minimum cost of the customer is Cp(z
∗
p). Similarly the total relevant cost of the
vendor is
Cv(z) = Cv1
∫ z
0
(z − y)fv(y)dy + Cv2
∫ ∞
z
(y − z)fv(y)dy
Cv(z) is a convex function of z and its minimum occurs at z
∗
v where
φv(z
∗
v) =
∫ z∗v
0
fv(y)dy =
Cv2
Cv1 + Cv2
The minimum cost of the vendor is Cv(z
∗
v).
If the customer’s ELS (z∗p) is adopted by both parties, the vendor’s total relevant
cost is Cv(z
∗
p). Since Cv(z) is a convex function and z
∗
v is its minimum point, so
Cv(z
∗
p) > Cv(z
∗
v), i.e the vendor will be in a disadvantageous position with a loss of
amount
ACPv(z
∗
v → z∗p) = Cv(z∗p)− Cv(z∗v)
which is his absolute cost penalty. Similarly if the vendor’s ELS (z∗v) is adopted by
both the parties, the customer’s total relevant cost is Cp(z
∗
v). Since Cp(z) is a convex
function and z∗p is its minimum point, so Cp(z
∗
v) > Cp(z
∗
p) i.e the customer will be in a
disadvantageous position with a loss of amount
ACPp(z
∗
p → z∗v) = Cp(z∗v)− Cp(z∗p)
which is his absolute cost penalty. Hence both the parties are in disadvantageous
position if one adopts others ELS instead of his own. If the optimum lot sizes of the
vendor and the customer are equal, then both the parties will automatically compromise
at the same lot size. If the optimum lot sizes are different, then it is necessary to find
out some intermediate common lot size for which one party will be gainer and the other
will be loser.
Next section is devoted towards the determination of such a lot size which will
benefit both the customer and the vendor without the need for cost sacrifice on the
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part of any. Using the nice properties of convex functions i.e C(z), Cp(z), Cv(z),
we shall prove that shifting from any initial status of the individual ELS to z∗ is
always workable and shifting from any initial status z0 other than the individual ELS
is workable in most of the situations. That is the gain of one party exceeds the loss of
another party.
4 Formulation of Stochastic JELS Model
Once the customer and the vendor fail to convince each other to accept his ELS, they
may come to a point of compromise in which the total cost of the inventory system
is minimum in stead of individual cost being minimum. In this case it is said to be a
Joint Economic Lot Size (JELS) model.
Suppose the demand of the customer and stock level of the vendor are identically dis-
tributed continuous random variables with common density function fp(x) = fv(y) =
f(s) say. Let (X, Y ) be the joint continuous random variable representing the random
demand of the customer and the random stock level maintained by the vendor, with
f(x, y) as the joint density function. Since X and Y are independent random variables
so f(x, y) = fp(x).fv(y). The expected joint relevant cost, C(z), for any lot size z is
the sum of the costs in all possible cases are calculated for t time period is,
C(z) =
∫ z
0
∫ z
0
(Cp1(z − x) + Cv1(z − y))f(x, y)dydx
+
∫ z
0
∫ ∞
z
(Cp1(z − x) + Cv2(y − z))f(x, y)dydx
+
∫ ∞
z
∫ z
0
(Cp2(x− z) + Cv1(z − y))f(x, y)dydx
+
∫ ∞
z
∫ ∞
z
(Cp2(x− z) + Cv2(y − z))f(x, y)dydx
=
∫ z
0
Cp1(z − x)fp(x)dx
∫ z
0
fv(y)dy +
∫ z
0
fp(x)dx
∫ z
0
Cv1(z − y)fv(y)dy
+
∫ z
0
Cp1(z − x)fp(x)dx
∫ ∞
z
fv(y)dy +
∫ z
0
fp(x)dx
∫ ∞
z
Cv2(y − z)fv(y)dy
+
∫ ∞
z
Cp2(x− z)fp(x)dx
∫ z
0
fv(y)dy +
∫ ∞
z
fp(x)dx
∫ z
0
Cv1(z − y)fv(y)dy
+
∫ ∞
z
Cp2(x− z)fp(x)dx
∫ ∞
z
fv(y)dy +
∫ ∞
z
fp(x)dx
∫ ∞
z
Cv2(y − z)fv(y)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
fv(y)dy
[∫ z
0
Cp1(z − x)fp(x)dx+
∫ ∞
z
Cp2(x− z)fp(x)dx
]
+
∫ ∞
0
fp(x)dx
[∫ z
0
Cv1(z − y)fp(v)dy +
∫ ∞
z
Cv2(y − z)fv(y)dy
]
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Since
∫∞
0 fp(x)dx =
∫∞
0 fv(y)dy = 1 and X and Y are identically distributed random
variables, so the above equation takes the form,
C(z) = (Cp1 + Cv1)
∫ z
0
(z − s)f(s)ds+ (Cp2 + Cv2)
∫ ∞
z
(s− z)f(s)ds
= Cp(z) + Cv(z)
C(z), being the sum of two convex functions is a convex function of z and its minimum
occurs at z∗ where,
φ(z∗) =
∫ z∗
0
f(s)ds =
Cp2 + Cv2
Cp1 + Cp2 + Cv1 + Cv2
The minimum total joint cost of the system is C(z∗). If the customer and the ven-
dor accepts this joint lot size in place of their own then their expected cost will be
Cp(z
∗) and Cv(z∗) respectively. To express the complicated expressions appearing in
the subsequent discussions in simple forms, we define
α =
Cp2
Cv2
β =
Cp1 + Cp2
Cv1 + Cv2
α is the ratio of the shortage cost of the customer to that of vendor and β is the ratio
of the total cost of the customer to that of the vendor.
The following relations can be easily derived from the above equations.
φ(z∗) =
1 + 1α
1 + 1
β
φp(z∗p) =
[
1 + α
1 + β
]
φv(z
∗
v)
LEMMA 4.1 If α < β then z∗p < z
∗ < z∗v
If α = β then z∗p = z
∗ = z∗v
If α > β then z∗p > z
∗ > z∗v
Proof of the lemma is easy and straight forward since φ, φp, φv are bijective and
monotonically increasing functions.The physical interpretation of the above lemma is
that,the joint lot size of the inventory system always lies in between the individual
optimum lot sizes when both the ratios are different.
5
5 Effect of individual optimization on adopting JELS
Since the joint lot size of the system minimizes the total cost of the system as well as
lies in between the individual optimum lot sizes, both the parties have an option to
accept this joint lot size. If α = β then z∗p , z
∗ and z∗v will coincide. Hence in this case
there will be no necessity of negotiation between two parties. Now we discuss different
cases related to α 6= β.
CASE-I:(Utility of JELS if customer’s ELS is in effect)
Suppose the customer’s ELS, z∗p is in effect and each of the vendor and the customer
change their lot size to z∗.
(i) If α < β then z∗p < z
∗ < z∗v . Since Cp(z) and Cv(z) are convex functions of z
with minimum at z∗p and z
∗
v respectively. So Cp(z
∗) > Cp(z∗p) and Cv(z
∗
p) > Cv(z
∗).
Hence if the vendor accepts the JELS instead of customer’s ELS , the absolute cost
advantage of the vendor i.e ACAv(z
∗
p → z∗) is
ACAv(z
∗
p → z∗) = Cv(z∗p)− Cv(z∗)
The absolute cost penalty of the customer, if he accepts z∗ in stead of his own lot size
z∗p is
ACPp(z
∗
p → z∗) = Cp(z∗)− Cp(z∗p)
ACAv(z
∗
p → z∗)− ACPp(z∗p → z∗) = [Cv(z∗p)− Cv(z∗)]− [Cp(z∗)− Cp(z∗p)]
= [Cv(z
∗
p) + Cp(z
∗
p)]− [Cp(z∗) + Cv(z∗)]
= C(z∗p)− C(z∗)
which is positive since C(z) is a convex function. That is, absolute cost advantage
of the vendor is more than the absolute cost penalty of the customer. The joint cost
advantage is defined as
JACAv(z
∗
p → z∗) = ACAv(z∗p → z∗)− ACPp(z∗p → z∗)
= C(z∗p)− C(z∗)
(ii) If α > β then z∗p > z
∗ > z∗v . As in (i), it is trivial that Cv(z
∗
p) > Cv(z
∗) and
Cp(z
∗) > Cp(z∗p). Then the vendor gets some benefit if the customer’s ELS, (z
∗
p), is in
effect and he changes it to JELS. Hence his absolute cost advantage is ACAv(z
∗
p → z∗)
and the customer faces a loss of amount ACPp(z
∗
p → z∗). As in (I) it is easy to see
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that the vendor and the customer get a joint absolute cost advantage JACAv(z
∗
p →
z∗) = C(z∗p)− C(z∗).
Hence in case α 6= β, the above discussion implies that the vendor is in advantageous
position if the customer’s ELS is in effect and both parties change it to the JELS. So
to continue the inventory management for a long period and to make the negotiation
successful, the vendor can compromise the loss of the customer by fixing some price
discount. To attract the customer to change his own lot size to joint lot size the vendor
may offer a total price discount d for which the upper and lower bounds are given by
ACPp(z
∗
p → z∗) ≤ d ≤ ACAv(z∗p → z∗)
If d = ACPp(z
∗
p → z∗) then all benefits, by adopting JELS will go to the vendor
and the customer is indifferent between his own ELS and JELS. On the other hand if
d = ACAv(z
∗
p → z∗) then all benefits will go to the customer and the vendor’s total
relevant cost remains unaltered. To be fair to both, the joint benefit for total demand
may be divided equally between both parties. Hence the actual discount given by the
vendor is
JACAv(z
∗
p → z∗)
2
and the optimum unit price discount 4 is
4 = JACAv(z
∗
p → z∗)
2m
Where m is the expectation of the random variable X(or Y since they are identical)
CASE II (Utility of JELS when vendor’s ELS is in effect)
Suppose the vendor’s ELS is in effect and both the customer and the vendor change
their individual lot size to JELS. As in case I, we can analyze the effectiveness of the
JELS on each party for different values of α and β.
(i) If α < β then z∗p < z
∗ < z∗v The absolute cost advantage of the customer is,
ACAp(z
∗
v → z∗) = Cp(z∗v)− Cp(z∗)
which is always positive and the absolute cost penalty of the vendor is
ACPv(z
∗
v → z∗) = Cv(z∗)− Cv(z∗v)
As discussed in case I, the joint absolute cost advantage can be
JACAp(z
∗
v → z∗) = ACAp(z∗v → z∗)− ACPv(z∗v → z∗)
= C(z∗v)− C(z∗)
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which is positive since C(z) is a convex function and z∗ is its minimum point.Thus
the customer gains and the vendor loses in this situation.
(ii) If α > β then z∗p > z
∗ > z∗v
Then the customer gets some benefit if the vendor’s ELS, z∗v is in effect and he
changes it to JELS. Hence his absolute cost advantage is ACAp(z
∗
v → z∗) and the
vendor faces a loss of amount ACPv(z
∗
v → z∗). Both parties get a joint absolute
cost advantage JACAp(z
∗
v → z∗).
Hence in case α 6= β, the above discussion implies that the customer is in an
advantageous position if the vendor’s ELS is in effect and both parties change it
to the JELS. In order to continue his purchase from the vendor for a long period,
the customer can persuade the vendor to change his lot size to JELS by offering
some price increase, d′ for which the upper and the lower bounds are given by
ACPv(z
∗
v → z∗) ≤ d′ ≤ ACAp(z∗v → z∗)
If d′ = ACPv(z∗v → z∗), all benefits by adopting JELS, will go to the customer
where if d′ = ACAp(z∗v → z∗), all benefits will go to the vendor. Hence to be
fair to both the joint benefit may be divided equally between the vendor and the
customer. The actual value of d′ is,
JACAp(z
∗
v → z∗)
2
and the optimum unit price discount i.e ∇ is,
∇ = JACAp(z
∗
v → z∗)
2m
CASE III(Utility of JELS when any ELS is in effect)
In this case the effect of JELS is compared with any ELS z0 other than individual
ELS i.e z∗p and z
∗
v .
(i) If Cv(z
∗) > Cv(z0) and Cp(z∗) < Cp(z0) then vender will be in disadvanta-
geous position and the customer is in advantageous position. ACPv(z0 →
z∗) and ACAp(z0 → z∗) are the vendor’s absolute cost penalty and cus-
tomer’s absolute cost advantage respectively. Hence the joint absolute cost
advantage is
JACAp(z0 → z∗) = ACAp(z0 → z∗)− ACPv(z0 → z∗)
The unit price discount can be determined as in case II.
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(ii) If Cv(z
∗) < Cv(z0) and Cp(z∗) < Cp(z0) then both the vender the customer
will be advantageous position with absolute cost advantage ACAv(z0 → z∗)
and ACAp(z0 → z∗). Hence in this case it is more advisable to accept the
JELS in place of z0.
(iii) If Cv(z
∗) > Cv(z0) and Cp(z∗) > Cp(z0) then both the vender and the
customer will be in disadvantageous position and their absolute cost penalty
are respectively ACPv(z0 → z∗) and ACPp(z0 → z∗). Hence in this case it
is more advisable to accept z0 in place of the JELS.
(iv) If Cv(z
∗) < Cv(z0) and Cp(z∗) > Cp(z0) then vender will be in advan-
tageous position and the customer will be in disadvantageous position.
ACAv(z0 → z∗) and ACPp(z0 → z∗) are the vendor’s absolute cost ad-
vantage and customer’s absolute cost penalty respectively. Hence the joint
absolute cost advantage is
JACAv(z0 → z∗) = ACAv(z0 → z∗)− ACPp(z0 → z∗)
The unit price discount can be determined as in case I.
6 Numerical example
Suppose an inventory item is produced by a vendor on a lot for lot basis by
the order of the customer. The vendor is the customer’s sole source for this
item. A single customer weekly orders and buys a batch of this item from
the vendor. Suppose the demand and the stock size are independent and
identically distributed random variables belonging to the standard normal
distribution. Since these random variables are distributed over [0,∞), so
we may consider them as normally distributed random variables truncated
at 0 i.e the density function, f(s) is
f(s) =
 (2/
√
2pi)e−
s2
2 s ≥ 0
0 s < 0
Cp1 = $80, Cp2 = $20, Cv1 = $120, Cv2 = $40. The costs related to the
inventory system are expressed in terms of 100 dollars. There is no set up
cost and lead time is zero.
Here m =
√
2
pi
, α = 0.5, β = 0.625, z∗ = 0.29, z∗p = 0.25, z
∗
v = 0.32.
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Cv(z
∗) = 2
[
z∗
2
α−β
β+1
Cv2 +
Cv1+Cv2√
2pi
e−
(z∗)2
2 − Cv1√
2pi
]
= $2576.62
Cp(z
∗) = 2
[
z∗
2
β−α
β+1
Cv2 +
Cp1+Cp2√
2pi
e−
(z∗)2
2 − Cp1√
2pi
]
= $1356.44
Cv(z
∗
v) = 2
[
Cv1+Cv2√
2pi
e−
(z∗v)2
2 − Cv1√
2pi
]
= $2554.36
Cp(z
∗
v) = 2
 z∗vCv2(β−α)
2
+ β(Cv1+Cv2)e
− (z
∗
v)
2
2√
2pi
− Cp1√
2pi
 = $1357.53
Cv(z
∗
p) = 2
[
z∗pCp2
2
(
1
β
− 1
α
)
+ Cv1+Cv2√
2pi
e−
(z∗p)2
2 − Cv1√
2pi
]
= $2598.76
Cp(z
∗
p) = 2
[
Cp1+Cp2√
2pi
e−
(z∗p)2
2 − Cp1√
2pi
]
= $1350.284
ACPp(z
∗
p → z∗v) = $7.2478, ACPv(z∗v → z∗p) = $44.4032. Thus either in
case z∗p → z∗v or z∗v → z∗p , the customer or the vendor will be in loss. Hence
they will search for a compromise at JELS. Suppose the customer’s ELS is
in effect. Then ACAv(z
∗
p → z∗) = $22.1442 and ACPp(z∗p → z∗) = $6.1597.
Hence discount given by the vendor to the customer per unit item over total
expected lot size of the customer is $10.01680. If the customer is persuaded
to change his lot size from 0.25 to 0.29 then the vendor has to offer a total
discount of $7.99225. Vendor’s net gain is $14.15195. Hence customer’s gain
per unit item is
(1/m)
[
(JACAv(z
∗
p → z∗)/2)− ACPp(z∗p → z∗)
]
= $2.29676
Therefore the total cost of the customer per unit item is reduced to (Cp1 +
Cp2)−4 = $9989.98 in stead of the original cost i.e Cp1 + Cp2 = $10, 000.
In the given example, the lot size and the absolute cost advantages/penalties
as well as the net gains/penalties and unit discounts in terms of rupees
appear to be insignificant. But in case of heavy industry where continuous
production is made in units of metric tons and the money transactions are
made in terms of crores of rupees (like iron and steel industries or sugar
producing industries etc.), the above results are of immense significance.
7 Conclusion
In this paper a detailed analysis has been made to show how inventory
related costs vary through closer interaction between the vendor and the
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customer. The unit price and the order quantity etc are settled by negotia-
tion between both the parties to minimize the total relevant costs. If JELS
is adopted by both, the gain or loss are to be shared reasonably between
them so that both will come to a mutual compromise. JELS model not only
minimizes the total relevant cost of the system but also searches a common
lot size with no loss to both. In this model the set up cost is assumed to
be zero. Even if we consider the set up cost of both the parties, this will
not affect the optimum lot sizes and the discount factor. It may be noted
that the effect of this JELS model can be verified in various other situations
with demand satisfying different continuous probability distributions like
exponential, gamma, chi-square, log normal etc. How ever the demand of
the customer and the stock level of the vendor are non-negative quantities.
In practical situations, the negative lot size bears no meaning. Hence If X
is distributed over (−∞,∞), then it should be considered with conditional
probability 0 for x negative. Following are the further research scope of this
paper.
(i) In many real life problems the random variables X and Y may not be
identically distributed random variables. The joint cost equation can
be determined if X and Y follow any general joint distribution and the
model can be studied in that situation.
(ii) The effect of JELS may be studied in more practical situations where
non zero lead time, multiple price break, order quantity etc are involved.
(iii) The idea of negotiation between single customer and single vendor may
extended to different situations involving single customer multi vendor,
multi customer multi vendor and multi customer single vendor.
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